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Research Summary: What drives middle managers to
search for new strategic initiatives and champion them to
top management? This behavior—labeled divergent stra-
tegic behavior—spawns emergent strategies and thereby
provides one of the essential ingredients of strategic
renewal. We conceptualize divergent strategic behavior as
a response to performance feedback. Data from 123 senior
middle managers overseeing 21 multi-country organiza-
tions (MCOs) of a Fortune 500 firm point to social per-
formance comparisons rather than historical comparisons
in driving divergent strategic behavior. Moreover, man-
agers’ organizational identification affects whether they
attend to organizational- or individual-level feedback.
These results contribute to research on performance aspi-
rations and strategy process by providing a multilevel,
multidimensional framework of performance aspirations
in middle management driven strategic renewal.
Managerial Summary: Middle managers are essential
actors in strategic renewal. Their unique positions offer
insights into operations alongside knowledge of strategy.
In contrast to typical assessments of managerial perfor-
mance with reference to a prior year, this research shows
that performance comparisons relative to peers and other
organizational units better motivate managers’ divergent
strategic behavior. Our results also show that managers
who identify with the firm are more attentive to organiza-
tional rather than individual performance discrepancies.
Thus, our study unveils an important approach for organi-
zations aiming to spark strategic renewal.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Research on the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) has shown that managers search for and initiate
new ways to improve organizational performance when it falls below aspiration levels (e.g., Baum,
Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998, 2003a; Harris & Bromiley,
2007; Kacperczyk, Beckman, & Moliterno, 2015; for a review see Shinkle, 2012). While this litera-
ture has added insight into when and why firms pursue strategic change, it has not unbundled and
examined contingencies associated with the type and level of performance feedback that managers
attend to. For example, while Cyert and March (1963) have distinguished historical aspiration levels
(a firm’s recent performance relative to its own past) and social aspiration levels (performance rela-
tive to that of other firms), empirical research has tended to aggregate these two reference points
(Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). In addition, past studies have mainly
focused on organizational performance feedback. Still, managers receive, and likely heed, feedback
about both the organization’s and their own individual performances. Finally, while prior research
agrees that poor performance produces search, it lacks consensus as to the effects of performance
feedback above aspiration levels (e.g., Greve, 2003a; O’Brien & David, 2014).
To address these research gaps, this study extends the BTF by drawing a broader picture of how
different types of aspiration (i.e., historical or social), the direction of the performance discrepancy
(i.e., above or below aspirations) and its level (i.e., organizational- or individual-level) all influence
managerial behavior. To this aim, we deliberately focus on middle managers. While middle managers
run particular units and receive feedback on unit performance, they are also subject to performance
systems that regularly provide feedback at the individual level, affecting bonuses and promotions.1
Middle managers also lie at the heart of strategic renewal (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Wooldridge & Floyd,
1990; Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd, 2008). They bring leadership to the strategy process by search-
ing for new strategic initiatives beyond the boundaries of current strategy that we define here as diver-
gent strategic behavior (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). Search in the form of
divergent strategic behavior helps organizations overcome inertia and achieve real and lasting strategic
change (e.g., Ahearne, Lam, & Kraus, 2013; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Wooldridge et al., 2008).
We develop and test hypotheses suggesting that social aspirations are more important drivers of
divergent strategic behavior than historical aspirations. This is because performance feedback on social
aspirations leaves less room for self-enhancing interpretations justifying poor performance while boosting
managerial self-esteem and self-efficacy when performance exceeds social aspirations. We further posit
1Dual-level performance feedback combined with their role in strategy process differentiates middle managers from top managers and
operating managers. Top managers’ performance, for instance, is more likely to coincide with the organization’s performance, thereby
blurring the multilevel distinction we are trying to study. At the lower levels, operating managers are less driven by performance feed-
back to engage in search activity with strategic implications. We elaborate on the generalizability of our theory regarding top and
lower-level managers in the discussion section.
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that the strength of managers’ identification with the organization shapes their allocation of attention
toward different levels of performance feedback. Identification with a higher collective motivates man-
agers to forego personal goals in favor of collective success (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008;
Hogg & Terry, 2000; Mael & Ashforth, 1992). Thus, we hypothesize that managers who identify
strongly with their organizations are more likely to respond to organizational-level feedback than those
who identify weakly, and vice versa. Lagged multisource data from 123 middle managers of 21 multi-
country organizations (MCOs) of a Fortune 500 company largely support our hypotheses.
Our study offers several significant contributions. First, we present a unique multilevel perspective
that integrates the BTF and social identity theory to understand how managers attend to individual-
and organizational-level feedback. Thereby, we contribute to the attention-based view of the firm
(Ocasio, 1997, 2011) and the neo-Carnegie school (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007). The former
focuses on how attention affects organizational change, but fails to explain why managers differ in
how they allocate their attention. The neo-Carnegie school calls for incorporating recent developments
in psychology to enrich the BTF. Recognizing organizational identification as a factor governing man-
agers’ attention addresses these calls and represents a new and potentially important contingency in
the BTF. Second, we show that feedback on performance discrepancies relative to other units and
peers is a potent driver of divergent strategic behavior. This finding adds to the BTF by delineating the
type of performance feedback that steers managerial search. Third, while prior strategy process
research has unearthed factors that offer resources and skills to carry out strategic activities (for a
review, see Wooldridge et al., 2008), factors that unveil why managers engage in divergent strategic
behavior in the first place have been overlooked. We therefore advance strategy process research by
adding to the understanding of the middle manager behavior that enables strategic renewal.
2 | MIDDLE MANAGERS ’ DIVERGENT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
In a series of studies, Floyd and Wooldridge (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Wooldridge & Floyd,
1990) describe middle managers’ roles in terms of convergent and divergent strategic behavior. Mid-
dle managers’ convergent strategic behaviors comprise implementing the deliberate organizational
strategy by translating it to lower levels and synthesizing new information to top management regard-
ing implementation. Analogous to the notion of search in the BTF, managers’ divergent strategic
behavior involves facilitating search for new strategic initiatives and choosing which to champion to
top management. While convergent strategic behavior in support of deliberate strategy is pre-defined
and overtly expected, divergent strategic behavior is most often not formally encouraged by top man-
agement (Floyd & Lane, 2000). That is, divergent strategic behavior is marked by emergent strategies
and entails extra-role behavior (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Nonaka, 1994).2 This behavior is vital to the
strategic renewal process (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007) because it populates the
intra-organizational ecology with a healthy variety of strategic options (Burgelman, 1994).
Why do middle managers exhibit divergent strategic behavior? Answering this question is essen-
tial for a complete theory of strategic renewal. Existing research has investigated much of the indi-
vidual, organizational and structural factors that enable middle managers’ strategic behavior. First,
scholars examining the psychological underpinnings of middle manager behavior have found that
middle managers’ emotional intelligence (e.g., Huy, 1999, 2002) emboldens support for their
2Divergent strategic behavior is also distinct from risk-taking. Risk taking entails uncertainty and variability in outcomes
(cf. Kacperczyk et al., 2015). However, initiatives that are not anticipated in the organization’s deliberate strategy may or may not be
associated with outcome variability.
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initiatives. Second, others have studied top management team (TMT) and middle management inter-
actions. Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra (2002) have linked managers’ strategic behavior with TMT
support. Mantere and Vaara (2008) has noted how top management’s role expectations spark or
hamper middle managers’ strategic behavior. Third, organizational structure, low formalization and
autonomy (Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009), and management control systems
(Marginson, 2002) have been identified as creating the setting for initiatives to emerge. Another sig-
nificant stream of research has associated middle managers’ behavior with their positions in the
organizational hierarchy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997) and in the social network (Ahearne et al.,
2013; Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007; Rogan & Mors, 2014). A favorable structural position makes
resources and channels available to influence top managers (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). While exist-
ing work has added significantly to our understanding of enablers behind divergent strategic behav-
ior, it fails to explain why managers engage in such behavior in the first place.
We propose performance feedback and social identity as important bases for explanation. Man-
agers search for and champion ways to renew organizational strategy based on organizational-level
performance feedback (Cyert & March, 1963) since they are accountable for their units’ perfor-
mance (Burgelman, 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000). Hence, organizational-level performance refers to
the unit performance that the middle manager is accountable for. However, individual-performance
may also impact divergent strategic behavior because the middle manager’s decision to pursue
divergent behavior is not “a form of altruism, but … [is] part of the organization’s opportunity struc-
tures of career advancement.” (Burgelman, 1991, p. 258). Moreover, since social identity defines
individuals’ goal preferences (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), we propose that the extent of identification
with the organization influences whether managers are drawn to individual- versus organizational-
level performance feedback. Figure 1 depicts our proposed multilevel contingency model for middle
managers’ divergent strategic behavior, which we describe in the following section.
3 | HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 | Organizational performance feedback as a driver of divergent strategic behavior
In its classical formulation, the BTF predicts that when organizational performance falls below aspi-
ration levels, such feedback will likely be interpreted to mean that the current strategy has failed to
deliver the desired level of performance. While using this formulation as a launch point, we posit
two factors shaping the way poor performance feedback is interpreted: (i) a manager’s tendency for
self-enhancement, and (ii) the competition among units for resources. Building on these two deci-
sion frames, one psychological and one organizational, we hypothesize that managers are more
likely to heed social rather than historical aspirations when unit performance is below aspirations.
Recent research has noted that response to performance feedback depends on how the feedback
is interpreted. In particular, scholars have theorized and found that poor performance triggers a ten-
dency to preserve a positive self-image—i.e., self-enhancement (e.g., Audia & Brion, 2007; Jordan &
Audia, 2012). Self-enhancement influences how managers identify the cause of low performance
and whether they engage in search. For example, objective conditions may indict the organization’s
strategic posture as the reason for poor performance thus reflecting manager incompetence. Yet, the
urge to keep a positive self-image may lead to subjective attributions connected to factors beyond
managerial control (Audia & Brion, 2007).
Poor performance may trigger managers’ self-enhancement motive, but the credibility of a self-
enhancing interpretation (e.g., “the goal was unrealistic in light of economic conditions”) is
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influenced by how the performance gap is defined. When the gap is defined in terms of the unit’s
historical performance (e.g., aspiring for revenue growth at 10% over the prior year where the unit
achieved only 5%), managers enjoy leeway in constructing attributions unrelated to unit activities as
causes of poor performance. This is because the passage of time incurs some inevitable change in
the external environment (e.g., “Bad weather kept shoppers at home;” “A new foreign competitor
undercut us on price.”). Such interpretations curb the sway of historical aspirations on search, mak-
ing them less likely to lead to divergent strategic behavior.
However, when the gap is defined in terms of the unit’s performance relative to other units in the
same business (e.g., aspiring for revenue growth equal to peers where the focal unit achieved signifi-
cantly lower growth), managers’ latitude to construct attributions unrelated to the unit’s activities is more
constrained. After all, units in the same business are subject to the same goal-setting process from the
corporate parent. To foster a sense of fairness and reasonable comparability, firms adjust subunits’ goals
to reflect strategically relevant differences. Thereby, performance gap comparisons become credible indi-
cators of problems for which middle management can be held accountable. Self-enhancing attributions
that rationalize negative performance feedback become less viable. Unit managers are therefore more
likely to search for solutions to performance problems by engaging in divergent strategic behavior.
Another situational frame that influences middle managers’ response to performance feedback
arises from the competitive nature of the resource allocation process among organizational units.
While the TMT formulates the overall strategy, especially in multidivisional firms, each unit oper-
ates (semi)autonomously and is held accountable for its performance. Units may collaborate and
share distribution channels, marketing campaigns and manufacturing for compatible products and
services (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992). Still, resources are allocated to subunits centrally by top
management based on differential performance (Gaba & Joseph, 2013). Put differently, performance
comparisons with other organizational units determine resource allocation. Although poor historical
Middle managers’ divergent 
strategic behavior
Organizational identification; H5
High (low) organizational identification increases (decreases) 
attention on unit level performance feedback and increases 
(decreases) motivation to forego personal goals in favor of 
organizational success.
Organizational performance below
Historical aspirations; H1a: (nil)
Self-enhancement motive leads to attributions of poor performance 
to external factors unrelated to unit activities, blunting influence of 
performance feedback.
Social aspirations; H1b: (+)
Self-enhancing attributions of poor performance to external factors 
are less viable because the unit is subject to the same external 
circumstances as other units that compete for resources.
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Individual performance above
Historical aspirations; H4a: (-)
Historical success makes managers cautious in order to avoid risk of 
losing ground by challenging a successful strategy.
Social aspirations; H4b: (+)
Heightens managerial self-esteem and self-efficacy, enables upward 
influence and increases credibility of initiatives.
Individual performance below
Historical aspirations; H3a: (nil)
Self-enhancement motive leads to attributions of poor performance 
to external factors beyond manager’s control, and respond by better 
management of the status quo.
Social aspirations; H3b: (+)
Self-enhancing attributions of poor performance to external factors 
are less viable because peers are subject to the same external 
circumstances, and competing with peers for bonuses and 
promotions motivates demonstration of proactive competence.
Organizational performance above
Historical aspirations; H2a: (-)
Signals current strategy’s efficacy, decreasing value of divergence 
and reducing motivation to change a winning strategy.
Social aspirations; H2b (+)
Heightens managerial self-esteem and self-efficacy and increases 
credibility of initiatives.
FIGURE 1 Theoretical model
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performance may invoke appeals for additional resources, the intra-organizational resource alloca-
tion process typically invests for superior potential returns compared across units (Hoskisson & Hitt,
1988). Thus, poor performance relative to other organizational units weighs heavily in managers’
perceptions about the effectiveness of the unit’s current strategy, thereby prompting the decision to
search for remedies by pursuing divergent strategic behavior. Consequently, we propose the follow-
ing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) The lower that organizational performance falls below
a. historical aspirations, no effect on divergent strategic behavior will be observed;
b. social aspirations, the more divergent strategic behavior will be observed.
When organizational performance is above aspiration levels, the BTF offers conflicting theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence. For example, when performance exceeds aspirations, Greve (2003a) has
noted that Japanese shipbuilders decrease R&D intensity, whereas O’Brien and O’Brien and David
(2014) reported an increase for Japanese-owned firms. On the one hand, prior research has argued
that when organizational performance exceeds aspirations, inertia pervades (Bromiley, Miller, &
Rau, 2001)—the underlying rationale being that there is no need to alter an already winning strat-
egy. On the other hand, high performance may yield slack resources, and this circumstance creates
room for search and experimentation (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). We resolve these conflicting views
via the opposing effects of social and historical aspirations.
When performance is above aspiration levels, we argue that middle managers respond to both
their units’ historical and social aspirations; but, different interpretations of feedback are in play. On
the one hand, when performance exceeds historical aspirations, this feedback signals the strategy’s
efficacy; and the value of new initiatives that diverge from the strategic status quo is then ques-
tioned. Managers’ interpretations of positive feedback lead them to perceive divergence from the
current strategy as a threat. In addition, a TMT’s potential posture of resistance toward altering a
winning strategy undermines managers’ belief in the success of new proposals, and managers prefer
to “stay the course” rather than search.
On the other hand, positive feedback relative to a comparison group (i.e., social aspirations) not
only signals a strategy’s success, but also reinforces a positive self-image of managers’ own skills
and organizational capabilities. Their success relative to other units heightens managerial self-esteem
and self-efficacy, bolstering the self-enhancing, hubristic tendencies found in many corporate execu-
tives (Park, 2007). This heightened self-confidence strengthens middle managers’ belief that engag-
ing in divergent strategic behavior will lead to new initiatives that further improve the
organization’s performance. This prediction is consistent with Tang, Li, and Yang’s (2015) finding
that hubristic self-confidence influences executives to pay more attention and allocate more
resources to innovation.3 In addition, a unit whose success stands out relative to other units enjoys
greater credibility, making initiatives emanating from the unit more likely to be endorsed by the
TMT (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Thus, we argue that greater credibility and high levels of self-
confidence arising from outperforming other units frame middle managers’ interpretations and offset
the BTF’s baseline prediction of reduced divergent strategic behavior. Hence, we hypothesize that
managers respond to both historical and social aspirations, but these types of feedback work in
opposite directions:
3Although research on executive hubris has thus far centered on top management, its pervasiveness in the general population
(Malmendier & Taylor, 2015) and the fact that senior middle-level executives like those in our sample are likely candidates for future
top management positions suggest the relevance of hubris among middle managers.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2) When organizational performance exceeds aspirations, middle
managers are likely to respond both to social and historical aspirations, such that the
more that unit performance increases above
a. historical aspirations, the less divergent strategic behavior will be observed;
b. social aspirations, the more divergent strategic behavior will be observed.
3.2 | Individual performance feedback as a driver of divergent strategic behavior
Middle managers aspire not only to advance unit performance; they also seek to improve their indi-
vidual performance. We argue that divergent strategic behavior emerges when a manager’s individ-
ual performance is below those of his/her peers rather than when compared to previous-year
performance.
Managers want to preserve a positive self-image. Individual performance falling below historical
aspirations puts managerial ability in the spotlight. However, they may justify the feedback by
attributing the source of poor performance to external circumstances beyond their control (Kluger &
DeNisi, 1996). In such cases, managers see no urgency or need to pursue divergent behavior. Their
focus remains on executing deliberate strategy and improving on previously agreed upon objectives,
because being a “good soldier” helps fulfill the positive self-image imperative. That is, managers are
likely to address historical performance-aspiration gaps by simply doing a better job in implement-
ing status quo objectives and strategy. Thus, it is less likely for negative historical performance dis-
crepancies to spur divergent strategic behavior.
The situational frame of peer-comparisons is also at play when managers perform worse than
their peers in the same unit. Here, self-enhancing interpretations become less viable since peers face
similar circumstances while attaining more relative success. Confronted with negative peer-to-peer
comparisons, managers are likely to feel inferior, resulting in the need to demonstrate proactive
competence. Upward comparisons to other more successful peers motivate them to close the perfor-
mance gap in order to rise into the group of high performers. In this case, divergent strategic behav-
ior becomes a more likely response to the dissonance felt from underperforming one’s peers. More
objectively, such comparisons imperil bonuses and promotions. This enhances the motivation to
develop strategic initiatives that showcase managerial ability and offer superior individual perfor-
mance outcomes. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) The lower that individual performance falls below
a. historical aspirations, no effect on divergent strategic behavior will be observed;
b. social aspirations, the more divergent strategic behavior will be observed.
Individual performance that exceeds aspiration levels also stimulates middle managers’ divergent
strategic behavior. This is because high performance elevates feelings of self-efficacy (Tolli &
Schmidt, 2008) and positive affect (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
“[P]eople … readily undertake activities and pick social environments they judge themselves capa-
ble of handling. The higher the perceived self-efficacy, the more challenging the activities they
select” (Bandura, 1997, p. 160). Divergent strategic activities are among the most challenging under-
takings in organizations since they aim to alter the strategic course of the firm. Krueger and Dickson
(1994) likewise noted that individuals who receive positive performance feedback experience higher
self-efficacy, viewing new challenges as opportunities despite risks.
The positive boost in self-efficacy is more likely to occur when managers perform better com-
pared to their peers in the same unit than to their own historical performance. There are several
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reasons. Firms’ regular conduct of performance appraisals put a manager’s promotion or job at stake
when peers outperform the manager. This is important because prior research has shown that when
such performance pressures are absent, executives may choose complacency and avoid difficult
decisions and costly efforts (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). However, regular performance assess-
ments make middle managers feel the need to perform simply to retain their jobs, bonuses and pro-
motions. Middle managers respected as better performers see value in searching for and
championing new initiatives as a way to maintain high-performer status. In addition, their relative
performance over peers justifies their proposals in the eyes of the TMT and enables upward influ-
ence (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). This translates to a higher perceived probability of successful exe-
cution regarding a worthwhile initiative.
In contrast, positive feedback on historical aspirations suggests that a manager is already on the
right track. But, since the reference point is the self rather than peers, there is little basis for feeling
superior. Rather than feeling especially confident, managers with historical success actually become
more cautious in order to preserve gains already secured. They perceive searching and championing
new strategic initiatives as jeopardizing their current high performance. Though these managers, too,
are subject to enhanced self-efficacy and positive affect due to the positive historical performance–
aspiration discrepancy, questioning the “right track” might be perceived as defiance since it risks
losing ground on what already works for the manager. Therefore, successful managers compared to
the previous year are likely to engage in less divergent strategic behavior.
Hypothesis 4 (H4) When individual performance exceeds aspirations, middle man-
agers are more likely to respond both to social and historical aspirations, such that
the higher that individual performance increases above.
a. historical aspirations, the less divergent strategic behavior will be observed;
b. social aspirations, the more divergent strategic behavior will be observed.
3.3 | Attending to individual- or organizational-level performance feedback
Since middle managers typically encounter both individual- and organizational-level feedback,
understanding what moves managers to heed one level of feedback over the other is important. Oth-
erwise, research may risk wrongly attributing behavior to one level when another is the actual driver
(Kacperczyk et al., 2015).
Toward this end, we draw from the theory of organizational identification—“[an] enduring state
that reflects an individual’s willingness to define him- or herself as a member of a particular organi-
zation” (Haslam, 2001, p. 382). Organizational identification shapes goal preferences in terms of
managers’ interest in the larger entity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Hence, organizational identification
may well explain the relative salience of individual versus organizational performance feedback in
driving divergent strategic behavior.
Managers’ organizational identification invokes questions about a relational (“who are we?”)
and a comparative (“how good are we?”) sense of identity (Ashforth et al., 2008). Individuals with
high organizational identification are more likely to depersonalize themselves (Hogg & Terry, 2000)
and internalize the larger organization’s performance and goals as their own (Ashforth et al., 2008;
Mael & Ashforth, 1992). Highly identified individuals further support their organization through
their extra-role behavior arising from their emotional attachment to and internalization of organiza-
tional norms (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Riketta, 2005). Ashford and Barton (2007) also have pro-
posed that more identified people envision collective benefits from their raising of issues, along
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with greater gain for themselves (in seeing themselves aiding a collective that they esteem). Identify-
ing with the organization therefore means that the value of a favorable outcome for the organization
is perceived as equivalent to the value of that outcome for the self.
When individual managers lack organizational identification, however, “I” does not become
“we” (Brewer, 1991). In this case, individual performance-aspiration discrepancies are more likely
than organizational-level ones to trigger divergent strategic behavior. This is because managers are
less interested in the success of the organization and may see strategic behavior as a means to
advance their own agendas. They lack “the cognitive connection between the definition of an orga-
nization and the definition a person applies to him- or herself” (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail,
1994, p. 242). Self-interest amplifies the perceived benefits of initiatives where the expected out-
come contributes to individual performance. Thus, for middle managers with low organizational
identification, individual level performance-aspiration discrepancies will be more salient predictors
of divergent strategic behavior. Accordingly, we propose:
Hypothesis 5 (H5) When organizational identification is high (low), unit (individual)-
level performance feedback explains more variance in middle managers’ divergent
strategic behavior than individual (unit)-level feedback.
4 | DATA AND METHOD
We collected data from a multinational business unit of a Fortune 500 company operating in the
fast-moving consumer goods industry. The business unit comprises a multi-divisional structure:
22 multi-country organizations (MCOs) overseeing all operations in over 70 countries worldwide.
An MCO, on average, is composed of 8.86 middle managers (S.D. = 2.32). MCO management
teams lead line managers and report to the global TMT of the business unit; the global TMT then
answers to the TMT of the company. These MCO managers can therefore be identified as middle
managers (Wooldridge et al., 2008).
Since MCOs operate in different markets, they need to make sense of, respond to, and adapt
their strategies to their respective markets. Yet, for new strategic initiatives, they must obtain the
global TMT’s approval and funding. Thus, the middle managers in our sample are well-positioned
to search for and champion new strategic alternatives, but they do not have the authority to change
the strategy without the TMT’s approval.
4.1 | Data collection
MCO managers constitute the individual level for our analysis and represent those whose strategic
behavior we are interested in examining. To assess managers’ strategic activities, we launched an
online survey. We targeted all 195 middle managers who managed the 22 MCOs. Eighty-five per-
cent of the respondents completed the survey, providing a sample size of 165. Respondents repre-
sented 35 different nationalities with 11.86 years of tenure (S.D. = 7.95) with the organization and
1.95 years of tenure in their current positions (S.D. = 1.24), on average. Sixty-eight percent of the
respondents were male, the average age was 40.27 (S.D. = 6.74), and 86.6% had earned a bache-
lor’s degree or higher.
To gauge individual and organizational performance, as well as managers’ demographics, we
used the firm’s HR database. Unfortunately, individual performance data were not available for
42 managers since they had been in the MCO for less than 2 years at the time of our study. This
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caused missing values because we lagged the performance data. Consequently, our final sample size
included 123 middle managers and 21 MCOs.
We conducted independent sample t-tests to check if the data included in the analyses signifi-
cantly differed from the data that we had to discard due to non-response or unavailable perfor-
mance data. Our tests showed no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents
in terms of age, tenure, gender, hierarchical rank, or past performance (where performance data
were available) (largest t-value was 1.52). Early-late respondent analysis also revealed no signifi-
cant difference in study variables (largest t-value was 1.17). Hence, non-response bias was not an
issue. We confirmed that managers with performance data did not differ from managers without
performance data in terms of gender or age. However, managers with performance scores had
markedly higher tenures (Mean difference = 2.84, t = 1.72, p = .09, 2-tailed) and hierarchical
ranks (Mean difference = 0.43, t = 5.16, p = .00, 2-tailed) as anticipated, since HR disclosed that
performance data were absent for newly hired managers. We retained both of these variables as
controls.
4.2 | Measures
4.2.1 | Divergent strategic behavior
Divergent strategic behavior was operationalized as searching for and championing new initiatives.
We measured managers’ divergent strategic behaviors using nine items adapted from Floyd and
Lane (2000) and Floyd and Wooldridge (1997) (Cronbach’s alpha = .86). We asked respondents
“To what extent do you perform the following activities?” A sample item reads as “Search for new
strategic opportunities.” The full list of items is presented in Appendix S1.
4.2.2 | Individual-level performance-aspiration discrepancy
The organization has a performance management system that annually assesses each manager’s indi-
vidual performance. These assessments are central to the firm and determine managers’ bonuses, sal-
ary raises, and promotion decisions. This process is managed by the global HR team and is
standardized across all MCOs. This makes individual performance scores comparable across MCOs
and rules out MCO-level differences in HR policies as an alternative explanation. Individual perfor-
mance reflected several objective measures and individual development goals. The senior vice presi-
dent of HR stated that individual performance scores have been normalized by accounting for MCO
performance (see Appendix S1). Therefore, individual performance measures are not confounded
with MCO performance.
Our theoretical framework has operationalized social and historical aspirations separately. His-
torical performance-aspiration discrepancy was calculated as the difference between current and
prior-year performance. Since our hypotheses argue that responses to performance above and below
aspirations differ, we use a spline specification. This splits historical aspirations into two variables
allowing slopes to vary for above and below aspirations (e.g., Greve, 2003a, 2008). This specifica-
tion sets the performance above-historical aspirations variable to zero if current performance is
below historical aspirations. Similarly, the performance below-historical aspirations variable is set to
zero when current performance exceeds historical aspirations.
To measure social aspirations, we subtracted each manager’s performance from the average per-
formance of other colleagues at the same MCO. As with historical aspirations, we calculated sepa-
rate variables to gauge discrepancy above and below the social aspiration levels.
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4.2.3 | Organizational-level performance-aspiration discrepancy
The BTF commonly assumes that firms form their social aspirations by comparing their perfor-
mance to industry average. Yet, there is ongoing debate that criticizes this practice and recommends
that comparison groups be identified according to fit the research context (Kuusela, Keil, & Maula,
2017). Our field work has revealed that other MCOs rather than external competitors embody the
relevant comparison groups (see Appendix S1 for details). This was because, first, the firm had no
global competitors active in all MCO markets for comparison purposes. Second, there were no mar-
ket research firms to provide market data across all MCO markets. Third, as discussed above, the
corporate resource allocation process is competitive based on unit performance, making MCOs inter-
nal rivals and prompting us to hypothesize other MCOs as the basis for social comparisons.
The company measured MCO performance as a composite score of underlying sales-volume
growth and operating margins. While we did not have access to the component values, we were able
to obtain final MCO performance scores. We measured each MCO’s performance aspirations in the
same way as individual aspirations. That is, we considered historical aspirations (i.e., MCO perfor-
mance in the previous year) and social aspirations (i.e., average performance of all other MCOs),
using a spline specification to measure MCO performance above and below historical and social
aspirations.
4.2.4 | Organizational identification
We adopted five items from Mael and Ashforth (1992) to measure the extent of a manager’s organi-
zational identification. A sample item read as “When I talk about [the MCO], I usually say ‘we’
rather than ‘they’” (Cronbach’s alpha = .80).
4.2.5 | Control variables
Previous research has linked managers’ strategic roles with their power (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Wool-
dridge et al., 2008) and their network positions (e.g., Ahearne et al., 2013; Pappas & Wooldridge,
2007; Rogan & Mors, 2014). To account for these alternative explanations, we controlled for mana-
gerial power and network centrality. We used three proxies for managerial power. First, we used
hierarchical rank, which is one of the most common measures of power used and recommended in
the literature (Tarakci, Greer, & Groenen, 2016). Second, we calculated a manager’s relative tenure
as the ratio of the manager’s tenure to the others’ average tenure in the MCO. Hierarchical rank and
relative tenure data were obtained from the HR database. Third, we used the number of connections
with TMT members, elicited through a network question asking respondents to name colleagues with
whom they most often discussed strategic issues. On average, respondents indicated 5.32 colleagues.
Using the same network question, in-degree network centrality was measured as the number of
times a manager was mentioned by other colleagues as people with whom they discussed strategic
issues. We log-transformed network centrality due to skewness.
MCOs face different local market dynamics. These dynamics may explain the variety of strategic
behaviors across MCOs. Therefore, we controlled for market dynamism and competitiveness via
three items for each as suggested by Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda (2006). Sample items
read “Changes in my national market are intense” and “Our MCO has relatively strong competi-
tors”, respectively. Next, individual responses were aggregated to calculate market dynamism
(Cronbach’s alpha = .68, median RWG(j) = 0.93, ICC1 = 0.14, ICC2 = 0.49) and market competi-
tiveness (Cronbach’s alpha = .87, median RWG(j) = 0.94, ICC1 = 0.09, ICC2 = 0.29).
Finally, politics can affect both the degree of social comparisons and whether or not merit is
rewarded (Kreutzer, Walter, & Cardinal, 2015). We thus controlled for organizational politics using
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the 6-item scale developed by Kacmar and Ferris (1991), with one item omitted due to low factor
score. One sample item reads “Favoritism, rather than merit, determines who gets ahead in this
MCO team.” We aggregated individual responses to quantify perceived politics at the MCO level
(Cronbach’s alpha = .77, median RWG(j) = 0.91, ICC1 = 0.20, ICC2 = 0.64). Table 1 presents
the descriptive statistics and correlations among variables.
5 | RESULTS
Middle managers in our data were nested in MCOs, and our theoretical model is built on a multile-
vel understanding of performance feedback. We tested if managers’ strategic behavior indeed varied
across MCOs. We estimated a null model without any predictors and examined the MCO-level
residual variance of the intercept. The ICC(1) was 0.14, which indicated that 14% of the variance in
managers’ divergent strategic behaviors can be attributed to MCO-level differences. This supports
the multilevel nature of managers’ strategic behaviors and mandates using a multilevel model that
allows random variation across MCOs.
Table 2 presents the results of multilevel regression analyses. Model 1 includes only the
individual- and MCO-level control variables. In line with prior research (e.g., Ahearne et al., 2013;
Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007), we found moderate support for more network central managers being
more likely to search for and champion new strategic alternatives (γ = 0.12, s.e. = 0.07, p = .07).
We did not observe a significant effect from managers’ hierarchical rank (γ = −0.04, s.e. = 0.07, p
= .59). In addition, we found a positive association between managers’ organizational identification
and divergent strategic behavior (γ = 0.14, s.e. = 0.06, p = .01). The effect of perceived level of
politics in an MCO was negative (γ = −0.36, s.e. = 0.11, p = .001, Model 4). This finding echoes
Kreutzer et al. (2015) who have proposed a negative relationship between politics and the perfor-
mance of new strategic initiatives.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the lower an MCO’s performance falls below the performance of
other MCO’s, the more the divergent strategic behavior, but not when an MCO’s performance falls
below its performance in the previous year. Models 2–4 test this hypothesis. First, we observed that
one standard deviation drop of MCO performance below social aspirations increased managers’
divergent strategic behavior by 0.35 standard deviations (γ = −0.35, s.e. = 0.11, p = .002, Model
4). Recall that a negative coefficient in the spline specification below aspiration levels is associated
with increased values of the dependent variable. However, we did not observe a significant relation-
ship when MCO performance fell below historical aspirations (γ = 0.08, s.e. = 0.07, p = .28). Sec-
ond, we conducted a t-test with the null hypothesis that the coefficient of social aspiration is larger
than that of the historical. This t-test provided empirical support for social aspirations being more
salient (t-score = 2.96, p = .002, 1-tailed) than historical ones. These results support Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that, in the case of positive organizational performance-aspiration dis-
crepancy, both social and historical organizational-level aspirations will drive strategic behavior, but
in opposite directions. Model 4 shows that divergent strategic behavior decreased by 0.3 standard
deviations as MCO performance exceeded MCO historical aspirations by one standard deviation (γ
= −0.30, s.e. = 0.09, p = .002); whereas, divergent behavior increased when MCO performance
increased beyond the other MCO’s average performance (γ = 0.28, s.e. = 0.09, p = .003). These
results support Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 focused on individual-level aspirations to propose that divergent behavior increases
when individual performance falls below social but not historical aspirations. Models 5–7 test this
hypothesis. We found that managers carry out divergent strategic behavior when the discrepancy
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between their individual performance and that of peers widens (γ = −0.20, s.e. = 0.06, p = .002,
Model 7). However, this was not true for individual performance below historical aspirations (γ =
−0.05, s.e. = 0.07, p = .48, Model 7). Conducting a t-test on Model 7 coefficients demonstrated
that the effect size of social aspirations is significantly higher than that from historical aspirations (t-
score = 3.26, p = .001, 1- tailed). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that when individual performance is above aspirations, social and histori-
cal aspirations drive divergent strategic behavior in opposite directions. Models 5–7 results offer
partial support for this hypothesis. Specifically, we observed that a positive discrepancy between
individual performance and social aspirations does promote divergent strategic behavior (γ = 0.15,
s.e. = 0.07, p = .028, Model 7). In contrast, although the sign of the coefficient for historical aspira-
tions is in the predicted negative direction, the effect was not statistically significant (γ = −0.01, s.
e. = 0.06, p = .93, Model 7). These results agree with the hypothesis that middle managers’ diver-
gent behavior spawns from positive discrepancies in individual level social aspirations, but do not
support the hypothesized negative influence of positive historical discrepancies at the individual
level.
Hypothesis 5 proposed that the extent by which individual- versus organizational-level discrep-
ancies drive divergent strategic behavior is contingent on a manager’s degree of organizational iden-
tification. We conducted a median split sample analysis4.5 Results appear in Table 3. Models 1–3
show that for managers with low organizational identification, only individual-level social aspira-
tions are salient enough to spark divergent strategic behavior when managers underperform their
peers. Using log-likelihood tests, we compared the variance explained in each model in the last row
of Table 3. Comparing Model 1 and Model 3, we found that inserting individual-level performance
feedback in Model 1 explained significant additional variance (χ2 (4) = 8.98, p = .062, Model 1 vs
3). In contrast, adding organizational feedback to Model 2 did not increase explanatory power (χ2
(4) = 2.20, p = .698, Model 2 vs 3). Models 4 and 5 present results for managers with high organi-
zational identification. For these managers, adding organizational-level performance feedback signif-
icantly increased the variance accounted for (χ2 (4) = 13.04, p = .011, Model 5 vs 6) while
individual-level feedback failed to account for additional variance (χ2 (4) = 5.80, p = .214, Model
4 vs 6). Hence, we conclude that for managers with low (high) organizational identification,
individual- (organizational-) level performance feedback explained significant variance in their
divergent strategic behavior. These results provide support for Hypothesis 5.
We collected qualitative data to better understand the context rather than for the purpose of confirm-
ing our results. Still, anecdotal evidence from interviews of middle managers is consistent with the quan-
titative findings. The Appendix S1 provides excerpts from our interviews with two middle managers
working in the same MCO. The interviewed managers’ MCO performed below other MCOs. One man-
ager performed above and while the other below their peers, yet they both championed strategic
4Split sample analyses are often criticized for reducing the statistical power (Aguinis, 1995; Maxwell and Delaney, 1993). However,
in multilevel analyses, the statistical power is also determined by the number of observations at the second level (Gelman and Hill,
2006). Therefore, median-split at the individual-level does not reduce statistical power since the number of observations at the second
level remains unchanged.
5An alternative way of testing the moderating effect of organizational identification was to create multiplicative interaction terms.
However, this would have required introducing eight more variables: type (i.e., social, historical) × direction (above, below) × level
(i.e., individual, organizational) combinations. Additional variables reduce degrees of freedom as well as statistical power. Overcom-
ing this limitation to some extent, another alternative was to aggregate the historical and social aspirations into individual- and
organizational-level by taking a weighted average of them. Finding correct weights is a challenge. Scholars often try all the alternative
combinations of weights (e.g., Greve, 2003a, see also Bromiley & Harris, 2014 and Washburn & Bromiley, 2012 for reviews). How-
ever, not only did we theorize conflicting directions for historical and social aspirations, but such an aggregation has been criticized
for lacking a theoretical basis (Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Washburn & Bromiley, 2012).
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initiatives—one focusing on sustainability, the other on staffing a new kind of sales team. The observa-
tion of divergent strategic behavior in both managers is consistent with the results for Hypotheses 3 and
4. We also note differences in the managers’ level of organizational identification and the corresponding
content of their chosen initiative. The manager with lower identification chose to champion the narrower,
functionally-oriented sales team staffing initiative that was more likely to be responding to individual
performance feedback. The manager with high organization identification, though, advocated the
broader, cross-functional sustainability initiative that was more likely to influence unit-level performance.
5.1 | Alternative explanations
We focused on social-historical performance comparisons at individual-organization levels and their
effects on divergent strategic behavior in an attempt to explain drivers behind this extra-role behav-
ior. In this subsection, we consider two possible sets of alternative explanations: one based on the
institutional and cultural contexts of the MCOs, and a second based on organizational structure and
resource interdependencies among the MCOs.
5.1.1 | MCOs’ home country institutions and culture
Greve (2003b, p. 697) has argued that “cultural and institutional differences may cause differences in
responsiveness to different goal variables.” Because MCOs in our sample span multiple cultures and
institutional contexts, these differences may have been an important force impeding or encouraging
divergent behavior by regulating the acceptance of extra-role behaviors and/or the importance that man-
agers attach to aspirations. We examine four factors that have cultural and institutional implications.
Regarding the cultural factors, we controlled for Hofstede’s collectivism and uncertainty avoid-
ance cultural dimensions (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Collectivist cultures are prone to
espouse compliant behavior where straying from the norm—e.g., the deliberate strategy—is rare and
perceived negatively. Likewise, uncertainty avoidance entails whether the culture is intolerant of
behavior that may inject uncertainty arising from divergent strategic behavior. We obtained the rele-
vant indices from Hofstede’s webpage.6
Considering institutional factors, we added degree of business freedom and political constraint
as controls since managers may attribute poor performance to institutional context in countries with
political turbulence, and these obstacles to doing business may hinder managers from search. To
measure business freedom, we used the Index of Economic Freedom, which is computed by the
Heritage Foundation (2017). To measure political constraint, we used Henisz’s (2000) Political Con-
straint Index (POLCON V).
None of these added controls had statistically significant coefficients (largest t-value belonged to
uncertainty avoidance; γ = −0.13, s.e. = 0.08, t = −1.67). Nor did they explain any significant variance
(χ2 (4) = 3.43, p = .49). The effects of performance feedback remained qualitatively similar. Only when
we included both cultural and institutional controls, the effect of organizational performance above his-
torical aspirations became significant at p = .10 level (γ = −0.17, s.e. = 0.10, p = .08, 2 tailed), in line
with Hypothesis 2a. We thus concluded that performance feedback explains managers’ divergent stra-
tegic behavior above and beyond cultural and institutional contexts.
5.1.2 | Organizational structure and resource interdependencies
We acknowledge the potential role of organizational structure as a setting for intra- and inter-
organizational behavior. For the firm in our study, for example, one could argue that our hypotheses
6https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html.
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might have panned out differently had the organizational structure fostered inter-unit cooperation
(e.g., vertical integration, shared services and other “synergies”). At the same time, such structures
ease the development of close and frequent interactions across units, which could logically be asso-
ciated with a greater tendency to rely on social comparisons (Obloj & Zenger, 2017)—creating a
context that would favor our hypotheses. The units in this study were not organized this way: MCOs
were dispersed across heterogeneous geographic regions, thereby limiting interdependency among
MCOs. They did not share marketing, sales or manufacturing facilities. Instead, global functional
teams running support functions such as Human Resources, Finance and Information Technology
facilitated coordination across MCOs. Divisions operated independently from one another, a pattern
typical of unrelated structures (Hill et al., 1992) having few opportunities to form close and frequent
interactions. The fact that social comparisons were important even in this setting suggested that
structure, at least in this form, likely did not account for our findings.
6 | DISCUSSION
Middle managers, positioned in between operational realities and organizational strategy, are at the
forefront of the strategic renewal process as they search for and champion new strategic initiatives.
To better understand the factors influencing why and when middle managers engage in divergent
strategic behavior, we developed a multilevel model of performance aspirations and tested it using a
sample of middle managers at a business unit of a Fortune 500 company. We found that managers’
individual- and organizational-level social aspirations influenced their divergent strategic behavior.
In addition, our results earmarked organizational identification as a key factor influencing the rela-
tive salience of organizational and individual level aspirations. These findings offer important contri-
butions to research within the BTF tradition (i.e., performance aspirations, the neo-Carnegie school,
and the attention-based view) and to strategy process research.
6.1 | Theoretical implications
6.1.1 | The BTF tradition
We advance the BTF by explaining how managers’ aspirations are formed and attention is allocated.
Prior research on performance aspirations has established strategic renewal as a response to perfor-
mance feedback, but it has mainly focused on firm-level performance and behavior. However, strate-
gic initiatives that fuel renewal also emanate from middle and lower levels. These managers often
recognize the need for strategic change sooner than senior executives and engage in emergent adap-
tive behaviors as a response (Burgelman, 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Wooldridge et al., 2008). By
expanding the scope of managers beyond top management, we thereby extend the relevance and
applicability of the BTF to understand individual managers’ strategic behavior. Furthermore, prior
research has cast search as a broad construct involving exploration and exploitation, with much
empirical investigation spanning R&D investment, capital investment, and mergers and acquisitions.
We add divergent strategic behavior as another relevant type of search, an especially appropriate
type in the middle management context. That is, managers’ divergent strategic behavior not only
involves facilitating the search for new strategic initiatives, but also entails choosing which ones to
champion to top management.
Equally important, lower, middle and top managers alike receive feedback not only at a collective
(e.g., firm, unit, team) level, but also at the individual level. Organizational performance feedback might
seem too distant for lower level managers; yet, they are still held responsible for the performance of their
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teams. Hence, feedback on team performance, as well as individual performance, should be relevant for
lower level managers. Regarding top managers, the BTF explains their strategic behavior by assuming
that organizational and individual performance are aligned through instruments such as stock options in
the executives’ compensation plans (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). If this alignment is weakened,
top managers are deemed likely to divide their attention between individual and organizational perfor-
mances. Our study not only proposes a richer, multilevel understanding of performance feedback, but
also helps to explain when managers attend to individual- versus organizational-level feedback.
We herein respond to appeals from the neo-Carnegie school to incorporate recent insights from
psychology as a complement to the BTF (Gavetti et al., 2007). Toward this end, we make a poten-
tial contribution to the field’s understanding about when middle managers’ divergent strategic
behavior contributes to firm renewal versus when it reflects self-serving individual goals. Our
findings show that managers with high organizational identification seek to close gaps between
their organization’s performance and those of other organizations. Managers with low organiza-
tional identification, however, are more attuned to the gap between their own individual perfor-
mance and the performance of social referents. Because social identity constitutes an important
part of the self-concept at all levels of the hierarchy (Mael & Ashforth, 1992), these findings can
be extended from the middle to both lower level and top managers. Broadly, our results thus sug-
gest a contingent association between managerial behavior and performance feedback. This insight
is important because the uncertainty surrounding divergent strategic behavior makes it difficult to
specify and incite in advance with formal incentives (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Even long-run incen-
tives such as stock options for top executives may not encourage attention to organizational per-
formance discrepancies and search associated with divergent strategic behavior (Sanders &
Hambrick, 2007).
Relatedly, we further add two novel insights to the attention-based view, which argues that managers
selectively attend to a limited of set of stimuli (Ocasio, 1997, 2011). First, in support of this view, we
found that both organizational- and individual-level social aspirations underpin managers’ strategic
behavior. This finding demonstrates that attention allocation encompasses type, direction, and level of
performance feedback. The opposing effects of social and historical aspirations when performance
exceeds aspirations is one example of how the type of feedback influences attention, shedding light on
various conflicting findings in prior research (e.g., Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Bromiley et al., 2001; Greve,
2003a; O’Brien & David, 2014). Another example is the relative salience of social over historical aspira-
tions. When aggregating historical and social aspirations into a single aspiration level through grid
search, prior research has assumed more weight for social (e.g., Greve, 1998, 2003a, 2008) or historical
aspirations (e.g., Gaba & Joseph, 2013). We propose a finer-grained understanding of how managers dif-
ferentially allocate their attention to both social and historical aspirations at multiple levels.
Second, Ocasio (1997, p. 189) has argued that “cognition and action of individuals are not pre-
dictable from the knowledge of individual characteristics, but are derived from the specific organiza-
tional context and situations that individual decision-makers find themselves in.” Perhaps, this is
why the attention-based view has argued that “decision-makers are more likely to consider and to
attend [issues] with greater legitimacy, value, and relevance to the organization” (Ocasio, 1997:
198). In stark contrast, our study demonstrates that managers’ individual traits (e.g. their organiza-
tional identification) do matter, and this might be why managers may not always attend to what is
more relevant and valuable for the organization. We found that those managers may not allocate
attention to feedback related to their organizations’ performance because of their low organizational
identification. We thus advise the incorporation of individual characteristics to help explain manage-
rial attention and self-serving behavior.
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6.1.2 | Strategy process
An important contribution here is to strategy-process research, and particularly to the study of mid-
dle managers’ strategic behavior. Prior research has offered unique insights by associating middle
managers’ strategic behavior with certain hierarchical ranks (e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Floyd &
Lane, 2000; Wooldridge et al., 2008) or network positions (e.g., Ahearne et al., 2013; Pappas &
Wooldridge, 2007; Rogan & Mors, 2014). In contrast, our findings showed that behavioral factors
beyond rank or connection (i.e., discrepancy between performance and aspirations) can offer fresh
ways of fathoming managers’ strategic behavior.
The behavioral perspective that we take at the individual level adds to the literature on middle
managers’ psychological traits and identities that impact strategy (e.g., Huy, 1999, 2002; Vuori &
Huy, 2016). The behavioral approach also allows for a more nuanced understanding of middle man-
ager behavior in the strategy-making process by spotlighting performance feedback as a driver of
divergent actions. Our contribution leads to a better explication of the intricacies embodying the
important role that middle managers play in strategic renewal.
The potential reliance on organizational identification and the fact that it varies widely among
managers (Glynn, 2000) provides another reason why renewal poses a difficult challenge for orga-
nizations. This offers support for the proposition that notable variations in organizational identifi-
cation among key managers may imperil organizational performance (Voss, Cable, & Voss,
2006). Strategy process research that investigates the relationship between managers’ behavior,
the renewal process and firm performance may be well served by a focus on the social identity
perspective.
6.2 | Limitations and future research
We studied several MCOs within the same Fortune 500 firm. This focus comprised comparable
organizations and allowed us to control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (e.g., organizational
culture, incentive schemes, organizational structure, etc.); however, this choice limits the empirical
generalizability of our findings.
First, our qualitative interviews revealed that the firm made regular performance comparisons
among MCOs instead of comparisons against the competitors due to lack of global competitors and
reliable market data (see the Appendix S1). Accordingly, these internal comparisons were more
salient for MCO managers in our context. Yet, we acknowledge that defining social aspirations rela-
tive to competitors might also be relevant in different contexts.
Second, although our data contain a representative sample of all MCO managers within the focal
business unit, our sample size is rather small. This makes it harder to detect true effects hidden by
low statistical power. This might be why we did not observe a significant effect for variables such
as historical aspirations and hierarchical rank. However, more observations or new samples may
yield effect sizes of different magnitudes. We encourage future research to replicate and advance
our findings with larger samples to confirm or refine our results.
Third, we acknowledge the potential role of organizational structure in setting intra- and inter-
organizational contexts, which could be an important force impeding or encouraging divergent
behavior. Our setting was not appropriate to examine this effect since our data came from different
organizations (MCOs) of a business unit using the same organizational structure and HR practices.
Although this controlled for structure effects to make comparisons across the MCOs more reliable,
structural differences among units remains a fruitful research path.
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6.3 | Conclusion
This study explained how individual- and organizational-level performance aspirations trigger mid-
dle managers’ divergent strategic behavior. We built theory on the strategic renewal process by
highlighting its behavioral underpinnings among middle managers. We also furthered performance
aspirations research by showing that whether individual- or organizational-level feedback is heeded
by managers hinges greatly on their degree of organizational identification.
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